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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an approach to automatic
detection of attacks on computer networks using data that com-
bine the traffic generated with ’live’ intra-cloud virtual-machine
(VM) migration. The method used in this work is the recently
introduced typicality and eccentricity data analytics (TEDA)
framework. We compare the results of applying TEDA with the
traditionally used methods such as statistical analysis, such as
k-means clustering. One of the biggest challenges in computer
network analysis using statistical or numerical methods is the fact
that the protocol information is composed of integer/string values
and, thus, not easy to handle by traditional pattern recognition
methods that deal with real values. In this study we consider as
features the tuple {IP source, IP destination, Port source and Port
destination} extracted from the network flow data in addition to
the traditionally used real values that represent the number of
packets per time or quantity of bytes per time. Using entropy of
the IP data helps to convert the integer raw data into real valued
signatures. The proposed solution permit to build a real-time
anomaly detection system and reduce the number of information
that is necessary for evaluation. In general, the systems based on
traffic are fast and are used in real time but they do not produce
good results in attacks that produce a flow hidden within the
background traffic or within a high traffic that is produced by
other application. We validate our approach an a dataset which
includes attacks on the network port scan (NPS) and network
scan (NS) that permit hidden flow within the normal traffic and
see this attacks together with live migration which produces a
higher traffic flow.
Index Terms—typicality, eccentricity, TEDA, anomaly detec-
tion, real time, computer networks, live migration
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of network traffic is not a trivial statistical
problem because it depends on protocols, traffic, type of appli-
cation, type of architecture (wired, wireless, mobile and so on),
bandwidth and other factors. Although, the tuple IP source,
IP destination, Port source and Port Destination, generally, is
known but it is not expressed conveniently in a mathematical
form. The reason is that the traffic is oriented and, therefore
it is not easy to analyse statistically. The feature that is most
commonly used to characterize the computer network traffic
for statistical analysis is the network flow rate (measured in
bytes per second or packets per second) [1]. However, this
is often not enough to detect effectively the possible hidden
attacks. Its change may be slow to show an attack or may not
be obvious at all [2]. While the flow rate contains sufficient
amount of information to detect a possible anomaly, in practice
it requires also a human involvement to analyse the data
pattern to detect (or even more to identify) possible attacks. At
the same time, the data centers and the ISPs (internet service
providers) deal with enormous amount of data (streams) - a
truly "big data" problem - the (real time) analysis of this data
is not possible to be done by a human due to its quantity and
the time required. This reality calls for the need to develop
different automated methods for analysis, detection (and, if
possible, identification) of anomalies (attacks, intrusions, etc.).
The signature of the packet may include information con-
cerning the tuple described above as well as other information,
e.g. the state of the connection, protocols, time to live (TTL),
fragmentation, and so on. There are number of challenges that
have to be addressed, including the amount of data that a
possible attack may affect - how to store such an amount of
data, how to process it fast enough (ideally, in real-time), how
to figure out the problem (to detect and identify the anomaly).
One practical complication is that the data is often encrypted
and the only available data are the packets, their rate, amount
and IP addresses.
In this paper we propose a new approach to detection of
attacks which is grounded on the recently introduced typicality
and eccentricity based data analytics (TEDA) [4]. Eccentricity
(and, respectively, typicality) are newly introduced concepts
and quantities which are closely related to data density,
similarity, mutual position and distances in the data space
[5]. They were introduced in a series of papers since 2014
by Angelov and his associates [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10].
They offer an alternative approach to the traditional statistical
data analysis and allow a number of restrictive assumptions
about the nature, amount and mutual (in)dependence of the
data to be lifted. They do not require the nature of the data
(random or deterministic) to be pre-defined or assumed, the
data distribution/generation model to be assumed and simplify
the well-known results such as Chebyshev inequality [11].
They make possible the entire analysis and decision to be
based on data and their pattern alone and not on our assump-
tions. They do not require theoretically infinite (practically,
large) amount of data and can work with as little as three
data samples [4]. Indeed, computer traffic data (similarly to
weather, financial and other data streams) is not random even
if it looks complex and noisy. It is clearly not deterministic, but
is not random, either. Therefore, TEDA is very suitable for real
data streams like the one mentioned above, because it does not
require them to be artificially assumed to be random, the data
distributions and data generation model to be assumed to be of
certain (convenient to work with) type (in practice they usually
assume normal/Gaussian or a mixture of Gaussians models).
Another important characteristic of TEDA is that it allows a
fully autonomous and self-evolving algorithms, because it is
non-parametric and it does not require any user or problem-
specific thresholds to be pre-defined or selected. It can also be
applied in real time and can dynamically self-evolve adjusting
to possible drifts [6]. The eccentricity (as well as the typicality)
works with discrete data directly which is very convenient for
data packets and network flow analysis which in our digital
age is naturally discrete.
Various tools and solutions for IDS (intrusion detection
systems), anomaly detection tools have been developed and
proposed [3]. The main difficulty in using Intrusion Detection
Systems is the low accuracy of the behaviour profiles. One
reason for this is that the networks work constantly and user
behaviour (especially of the attackers) is not constant - it is
changing, dynamically evolving. Currently existing methods
[12] require rebuilding the profiles models to update to these
changes. Since the computer network does not stop working,
these methods either ignore these changes or are offline.
A very important and difficult challenge is to extract
good/representative/descriptive signatures/features that make
possible to distinguish between the high volume, but normal
otherwise (attacks free) network flow from the anomalies
(caused by attacks) that provoke a high volume of the network
flow due to DoS (Denial of Service), Network scan, Botnet,
and so on.
Table I describes features that can be observed from the
computer network traffic [1].
TABLE I
ATTRIBUTES WITH LINGUISTICS LABELS
Attribute Linguistic Labels
Duration Short-lived, Long-lived
Average packet size Small, Medium, Large, Jumbo
Bytes Mice, Bulk, Elephants
Throughput Low, Medium, High
Packets Packet-Mouse, Packet-Bulk, Packet-elephant
Time (start, end) Day, Night
Direct usage of these observable features cannot provide a
solid guarantee against anomalies caused by malicious attacks.
For example, the reason for the Duration to be Long or The
average packet size to be Large can be that there is a Botnet
or an attack using vulnerabilities related to the memory leak.
Similarly, if the amount of Bytes can be characterized as Bulk
this may be due to the so called ”ping of death” attack. The
Throughput depends on the architecture, but if it is Low, that
may be probably due to sudden high traffic backup operation
or download of unauthorized content from P2P connections,
for example. On the other hand, if the Throughput is High
it is difficult to differentiate an attack of DNS flood from a
common background traffic caused by many users. For that
reason, if the analysis is based on Packets only because very
often the backups strategy is generally running at night, it is
possible to coordinate an attack using IP address spoofing such
the Packet mouse obtained during the day and hidden behind
the high traffic generated by backup at night.
Due to these difficulties, in this paper the concept of entropy
is used in order to convert the data to a quantitative form,
enabling statistical analysis [13]. We are motivated by the
need to detect anomaly in real time on network computers
without the necessity of creating a database of signatures to
train using a specific dataset that may change many times
during a year, a month or even a day. We propose an approach
that is generic and is capable to distinguish between normal
traffic and anomalous signals together with live migration
using the data published in [14]. We compare the proposed
new approach based on the eccentricity from TEDA with
the statistical alternatives based on kernel density estimation
(KDE) [14] and principal component analysis (PCA) [14].
II. ECCENTRICITY BASED ANOMALY DETECTION AND
ANALYSIS
The timely and correct detection of abnormal data samples
is a very important first step in the analysis of the anomalies.
It should be stressed that anomalies are contextual, they can be
temporal and dynamically evolving in nature [4]. Anomalies
in computer network attacks permit to study and develop
different new techniques that can prevent them or reduce
their malicious effect on the network infrastructure and users.
In some cases it may be possible to give a response to
complicated tasks on industrial computer networks, which is
very important nowadays when society and industry move to a
more connected and open mode of operation and functioning
[3].
The approach we propose is based on the eccentricity
which is defined in more details in [4] [5] [7]. Eccentricity
is defined within the new statistical framework called TEDA
[5]. Let us consider a real feature space Rm , where m is the
data dimensionality (this can be an Euclidian space with the
Euclidean distance, but it can also be Hilbert spaces, and one
can extend it to Reproducing Kernel Hilbert spaces, RKHS)
[5].
Let us now consider a data set or stream which rep-
resents features of the computer network functioning and
denote it by {x}N = {x1, x2, ..., xN} ∈ Rm;xi =
[xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,n]
T ;i = 1, 2, ..., N where subscripts denote
data samples (set) or when they arrive (stream). We can
then consider the eccentricity, ξ defined within the TEDA
framework based on the cumulative proximity, pi as follows
[5]:
a) For every point xi ∈ {x}N ; i=1,2,...,N one may quantify





d2(xi, xj);LN > 1 (1)
where d (xi, xj) is the distance between data samples xi and
xj .
Its importance comes from the fact that it provides density
information about each data sample in a scalar or vector form
(its value is inversely proportional to the data density [5]).
Cumulative proximity is a very important association measure
derived empirically from the observed data without making
any prior assumptions about their generation model [5].
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where µk is the mean and σ2k is the variance of the data
set after k samples. It is another very important association
measure derived empirically from the observed data without
making any prior assumptions about their generation model.
It quantifies data samples away from the mode, which is
very useful to represent specifically the distribution tails and
anomalies [5]. This quantity which is very useful and conve-
nient to detect and analyse anomalies is always between 0 and
1, i.e:
0 ≤ ξ (xk) ≤ 1 (3)
For anomaly detection under any type of distribution, one
can successfully use the well known Chebyshev inequality,
[n], which states that no more than 1/n2 are more than nσ
away from the mean, where σ is the standard deviation of the
data. In [5] if was shown show that the condition that provides
exactly the same result (but without making any assumptions
on the amount of data, their independence and so on) as the







It is often very difficult to get a data stream or set from a real
computer network under attack for understandable reasons.
Moreover, the amount of data is not balanced between the
different cases: i) normal data traffic, and ii) abnormal traffic.
In practice, the amount of data concerning ii) is drastically
less than the amount of data concerning i) which is also
quite obvious. It is also very difficult to get labels to each
data sample. Often the data samples are not directly from the
network but a result of processing. This is the case for the
popular KDD99 data set used as a well-known benchmark,
as well as for its better and modified version called NSL-
KDD. Both of these were generated a decade ago and current
studies show that this does not reflect the modern low footprint
attacks. The probability values from the distribution of the
training data set is different from the one from the testing
data set, but this is not a specific problem of our method.
This is a consequence of the irregular distribution and the
huge amount of data samples related to OS attacks and small
amount of normal data which does not permit to see possible
false negative alarms in the normal data. Although, corrections
were made on this problem in NSL-KDD in regards to the
previous data set KDD99, the problem of the old fingerprints
still persists as indicated in [15].
A. SECCRIT group dataset
Motivated by these problems, in this paper we propose to
use the data generated within the SECCRIT1 (SEcure Cloud
computing for CRitical infrastructure IT) project. This project
produced several papers and, more importantly for our study,
a dataset that allows a deeper analysis of more contemporary
style attacks (considering a modern data cloud environment).
One recent technology that is growing in popularity and
improves some facilities in the infrastructure of the Internet
is the so called Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). IaaS makes
possible to create virtual machines (VM) and deliver these to
various users. This is a useful new tool, but it also generates
new vulnerabilities. This requires more studies about the
security of this environment [16]. It is very challenging to
distinguish between a normal traffic and an anomaly generated
from an attack in the cloud environment, especially when
pursuing a high performance and using the strategy of Live
1http://www.seccrit.eu
Migration. Live Migration is a migration of virtual machines
(VMs) between physical machines without turning of the
computers (the physical machines). In other words, a "hot"
migration. One of the results of the SECCRIT project was
the dataset that permits to analyse anomalies or attacks on the
environment with live migration and other traffic conditions
in the background. The study about the anomaly detection
was done using traditional tools such as k-means clustering
method, (PCA) and Self-Organizing Features Maps (SOFMs)
[14] [16].
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the experimental results obtained
using standardized eccentricity of the data stream as a tool
automatically and in real time detect anomalies on the case of
SECCRIT data. The characterization of the data is shown in
Table II.
TABLE II
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DATA
Type Anomaly Intensity Migration overlap
High Low Normal Anomalous
NPS AH AL NM AM
The dataset that was created from a testbed Local Area
Network with live migration occurrence while experiencing
normal and abnormal traffic conditions. The experiment takes
10 minutes in total. The ground truth is that there is an
anomalous script which always starts at the fifth minute. The
methodology applied for creating the dataset includes a live
migration of VM which is called normal migration (NM)
period and occurs 2.5 minutes after the start of the experiment.
When there is an anomaly (anomalous migration, AM period)
it occurs 7.5 minutes after the start of the experiment (2.5
minutes after the anomaly). The intensity of the anomaly can
be labelled as low (AL) or high (AH). In our experiment, we
take raw captured packet files and create a capture bin with
duration of 1 minute to analyse the data of the network flow.
An important point in the analysis of the data from the
network is to extract information beyond the traditionally used
flow related parameters such as the flow rate (quantity of
bytes per time or quantity of packets per time). The reason is
that often the attacks are not visible in this data space (these
parameters may not change clearly when there is an attack).
Hence, we take a conversion of the qualitative information that
is so important for the analysis of the data from the network
such as the tuple IPSRC, IPDST, PORTSRC and PORTDST.
Other quantitative information that can be used is the protocol,
but this was not considered in the tests. Then we convert the











We use an empirical histogram X = wi, i = 1, ..., L, where
L is the size of bin and the feature i occur wi times in the






Below we plot the experimental outcomes with this entropy
applied to the tuple with the IP and the ports plus the flow
expressed in bytes and packets.The red line in the graphics
is placed to facilitate the visualisation of the start of the
attack, while the green line indicates when the live migration
starts; however it still represents a normal operation. When
attacks start it is possible to see the grown of the quantity of
packets, as in Figure 1(A) marked with red line. But when
the live migration start the number of packets is reduced due
to a greater volume of bytes takes the bandwidth as it is
possible to see on Figure 1(B). When analysing the entropy
of IPSRC/IPDST alone in Figure 1(C) and Figure 1(D), it
is not possible to easily visualise the attacks that start at the
red dashed bar, while the live migration, starting at the green
dashed bar, can be clearly identified in the chart. On the other
hand, entropy of PORTSRC and PORTDST are enough for the
attack detection while it does not trigger any alarms during the
live migration.
We first used the entropy of IPDST and PORTDST to test
if it is possible to detect the anomaly. When there is no
separation of input and output traffic, IPDST and IPSRC are
the same. However, in the case of separate flows, the features
are different. To distinguish between live migration or other
conditions such as backups, or other that change the flow
we add a second logical condition: if (ξ(xk) > n
2+1
2N ) and
(µH(X)L > µH(X)L−1). Where µH(X) is the mean of
entropy.
In this experiment, we chose to use the IP entropy and Port
Destination as input features to TEDA. The eccentricity chart
and binary indication of anomalies, which may translate into
automatic system alerts, can be seen in Figures 2(A) and 2(B).
The anomaly was detected before the start of the live
migration and after that. However, it was supressed during
the process. In this case we did not improve the signatures
using entropy of port source/destination against use quantity
of packets, as it can be see in the Figures 1(A),(C), and (D).
However using the entropy signature together with TEDA
we reduce the false positive and false negative rate alarm
generated in comparison to the case when we analysed just
the quantity of bytes as shown in Figure 1(B).
In this test, it is interesting to show the difference between
the flow data given by the packets and bytes quantities. It also
demonstrates that it is easier to characterize the anomaly using
standardized eccentricity. In other words, in the first case it is
possible to see the anomaly and in the second case - the live
migration. Then entropy of the IP source/destination, as it is
shown in Figure 3(C), is not better signature then the flow
of packets, as shown in Figure 3(A), but it is possible to see
that using the same signature as TEDA input produce the same
Fig. 1. Samples labelled with AH-AM, (A) packet flow, (B) byte flow, (C)
entropy IPSRC and entropy IPDST, (D) entropy portSRC and entropy portDST
Fig. 2. Eccentricity and threshold defined In Eq. 2 and 4 (A) absolute value,
(B) fault indication, label with AH-AM
outcome. The same behaviour occurs with the entropy of ports
and entropy of IPs.
In the last case, when using the newly proposed approach
(based on the eccentricity) to detect the anomaly we have a
false negative (FN) alarm at the moment live migration takes
place; thus, we have a false positive (FP) alarm for half of
the anomalous data samples. This is not necessarily a very
negative situation, but it shows that if the alarm was ignored
the proposed method can learn that this is a continuous and
normal environment and not an abnormal condition. We can
see this test on Figure 4.
The worst case is when an attack is completely hidden in
the background traffic or when is not possible to see it using
entropy of other parameters. In Figure 5, we illustrate the cases
with low anomaly intensity (AL) and normal period (NM) and
in Figure 6 the TEDA output and fault indication.
In this paper, we do not analyze the response time, but with
the obtained results it is possible to see that the proposed
method gives an outcome fast and in real time. In order to be
Fig. 3. Samples labelled with AH-NM, (A) packet flow, (B) byte flow, (C)
entropy IPSRC and entropy IPDST, (D) entropy portSRC and entropy portDST
Fig. 4. Process entropy using the proposed method, (A) eccentricity, (B) fault
indication, labeled with AH-NM
able to compare with other alternative methods, however, we
use the well-established criteria, which do not take the time
of detection into account. These include: i) accuracy (acc); ii)
false alarm rate (FAR) to evaluate the efficiency and reliability.
In order to obtain this, we calculate the metrics: true positive
(TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN). Then, FAR and accuracy are calculated by [17]:
acc =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(7)
In order to calculate the FAR we need the false positive rate













Fig. 5. Samples labelled with AL-NM, (A) flow of packets, (B) flow of bytes,
(C) entropy IPSRC and entropy IPDST, (D) entropy PortSRC and entropy
PortDST
Fig. 6. Process entropy using the eccentricity with different threshold, (A)
eccentricity, (B) anomalies detected, labeled with AL-NM
These are important in order to compare with the other
methods as we can see in Table III which represents the
results for the SECCRIT data using the proposed method and
in Table IV the results using Kmeans.
TABLE III
EVALUATION OF THE SECCRIT DATASET USING TEDA
Label TP TN FP FN Acc FAR online/offline
AH-AM 89 501 1 9 0.9833 0.0469 online
AH-NM 116 475 9 0 0.9850 0.0092 online
AL-AM 13 306 36 247 0.5299 0.5276 online
AL-NM 8 299 1 292 0.5116 0.4883 online
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have applied an automatic anomaly detec-
tion method based on the data eccentricity to real computer
network data from the SECCRIT project and dataset. The
results demonstrate that the proposed method makes possible
TABLE IV
EVALUATION OF THE SECCRIT DATASET USING KMEANS
Label TP TN FP FN Acc FAR online/offline
AH-AM 91 502 0 7 0.9883 0.0357 offline
AH-NM 116 463 21 0 0.9650 0.0216 offline
AL-AM 113 320 22 147 0.7192 0.3148 offline
AL-NM 0 274 26 300 0.4566 0.5433 offline
to automatically and successfully detect anomalies in NPS
and NS attacks. The IDS system based on signatures or
on statistical models needs a priori knowledge and huge
database with signatures. For example, if we compare the
results obtained with the work of [14], which used seven data
signatures, including a few that require to manually examine
a number of protocols and store larges amount of data, we are
still able to reliably detect networks attacks in real time with
much simpler signatures/features, without the need for high
computational power nor considerable a priori information.
Global normalization was done in the data for visualization
but is not necessary for real-time processing because the
entropy already takes care of it.
In future work, we will investigate the use of wavelet
transform to amplify the low attacks signatures in regards to
the flow and entropy.
REFERENCES
[1] F. M. Pouzols, D. R. Lopez and A. B. Barros, Mining and Control of
Network Traffic by Computational, Berlin: Springer, 2011.
[2] G. Dewaele, K. Fukuda, P. Borgnat, P. Abry and K. Cho, Extracting
Hidden Anomalies using Sketch and Non Gaussian Multiresolution
Statistical Detection Procedures., in SIGCOMM 2007 Workshop on
Large-Scale Attack Defense (LSAD), Kyoto, Japan, 2007.
[3] M. Ahmed, A. N. Mahmood and J. Hu, A survey of network anomaly
detection techniques, Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
vol. 60, pp. 19-31, January 2016.
[4] P. P. Angelov, Anomaly Detection based on Eccentricity Analysis, in
IEEE Symposium on Evolving and Autonomous Learning Systems
(EALS), Orlando, FL, USA, 2014.
[5] P. P. Angelov, X. Gu and J. C. Principe, A Generalized Methodology
for Data Analysis, IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 10 2017.
[6] C. G. Bezerra, B. S. J. Costa, L. A. Guedes and P. P. Angelov, A
New Evolving Clustering Algorithm for Online Data Streams, in IEEE
Conference on Evolving and Adaptive Intelligent Systems, Natal, Brazil,
2016.
[7] B. S. J. Costa, C. G. Bezerra, L. A. Guedes and P. P. Angelov, Online
Fault Detection Based on Typicality and Eccentricity Data Analytics, in
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), Killarney,
Ireland, 2015.
[8] P. P. Angelov, Outside the box: an alternative data analytics frame-work,
Journal of Automation, Mobile, Robotics and Intelligent Systems, vol.
8, no. 2, pp. 29-35, 2014.
[9] B. S. J. Costa, P. P. Angelov and L. A. Guedes, A new Unsupervised
Approach to Fault Detection and Identification, in International Joint
Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), Beijing, China, 2014.
[10] B. S. J. Costa, P. P. Angelov and L. A. Guedes, Fully unsupervised
fault detection and identification based on recursive density estimation
and self-evolving cloud-based classifier, Neurocomputing, vol. 150, pp.
289-303, 2015.
[11] J. Saw and a. T. M. M. Yang, Chebyshev inequality with estimated mean
and variance, The American Statistician, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 130-132,
1984.
[12] H.-J. Liao, C.-H. R. Lin, Y.-C. Lin and K.-Y. Tung, Intrusion detection
system: A comprehensive review, Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 16-24, January 2013.
[13] A. Lakhina, M. Crovella and C. Diot, Mining anomalies using traf-
fic feature distributions, in Proceedings of the 2005 Conference on
Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer
Communications, New York, NY, USA, 2005.
[14] N.-u.-h. Shirazi, S. Simpson, A. K. Marnerides, M. Watson, A. Mauthe
and D. Hutchison, Assessing the Impact of Intra-Cloud Live Migration
on Anomaly Detection, in IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cloud
Networking (CloudNet), Luxembourg, Luxembourg, 2014.
[15] N. Moustafa and J. Slay, UNSW-NB15: a comprehensive data set
for network intrusion detection systems (UNSW-NB15 network data
set), in Military Communications and Information Systems Conference
(MilCIS), Canberra, ACT, Australia, 2015.
[16] I. M. Stephanakis, I. P. Chochliouros, E. Sfakianakis and N. Shirazi,
Anomaly Detection In Secure Cloud Environments Using a Self-
Organizing Feature Map (SOFM) Model For Clustering Sets of R-
Ordered Vector-Structured Features, in Proceedings of the 16th Inter-
national Conference on Engineering Applications of Neural Networks
(INNS), Rhodes, Island, Greece, 2015.
[17] N. Moustafa and J. Slay, The significant features of the UNSW-NB15
and the KDD99 data sets for Network Intrusion Detection Systems, in
4th International Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering
Experience Returns for Security, Kyoto, Japan, 2015.
[18] R. Fontugne, P. Borgnat, P. Abry and K. Fukuda, MAWILab : Combining
Diverse Anomaly Detectors for Automated Anomaly Labeling and Per-
formance Benchmarking, in 6th International Conference on emerging
Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT), Philadelphia,
2010.
